The worst-case training principle that minimizes the maximal adversarial loss, also known as adversarial training (AT), has shown to be a state-of-the-art approach for enhancing adversarial robustness against norm-ball bounded input perturbations. Nonetheless, min-max optimization beyond the purpose of AT has not been rigorously explored in the research of adversarial attack and defense. In particular, given a set of risk sources (domains), minimizing the maximal loss induced from the domain set can be reformulated as a general min-max problem that is different from AT, since the maximization is taken over the probability simplex of the domain set. Examples of this general formulation include attacking model ensembles, devising universal perturbation to input samples or data transformations, and generalized AT over multiple norm-ball threat models. We show that these problems can be solved under a unified and theoretically principled min-max optimization framework. Our proposed approach leads to substantial performance improvement over the uniform averaging strategy in four different tasks. Moreover, we show how the self-adjusted weighting factors of the probability simplex from our proposed algorithms can be used to explain the importance of different attack and defense models.
Introduction
Training a machine learning model that is capable of assuring its worst-case performance against all possible adversaries given a specified threat model is a fundamental yet challenging problem, especially for deep neural networks (DNNs) [1] [2] [3] . A common practice to train an adversarially robust model is based on a specific form of min-max training, known as adversarial training (AT) [2, 4] , where the minimization step learns model weights that confine the adversarial loss induced from the maximization step in an alternative training fashion. On datasets such as MNIST and CIFAR-10, AT has achieved the state-of-the-art defense performance against p -norm-ball input perturbations [5] .
Motivated by the success of AT, one follow-up question that naturally arises is: Beyond AT, can other types of min-max formulation and optimization techniques advance the research in adversarial robustness? In this paper, we give an affirmative answer corroborated by the substantial performance gain and the ability of self-learned risk interpretation using our proposed min-max framework on several tasks for adversarial attack and defense.
We demonstrate the utility of a general formulation for min-max optimization minimizing the maximal loss induced from a set of risk sources (domains). Our considered min-max formulation is fundamentally different from AT, as our maximization step in taken over the probability simplex of the set of domains. Moreover, we show that many problem setups in adversarial attacks and defenses can in fact be reformulated under this general min-max framework, including attacking model ensembles [6, 7] , devising universal perturbation to input samples [8] or data transformations [9, 10] , and generalized AT over multiple types of threat models [11, 12] . However, current methods for solving these tasks often rely on simple heuristics (e.g., uniform averaging), resulting in significant performance drops when comparing to our proposed min-max optimization framework.
Specifically, based on the general min-max framework, we also show that these problems can be solved under the same optimization procedure and prove the rate of its algorithmic convergence. As a byproduct and an exclusive feature, by tracking the weighting factor associated with the probability simplex during training, our method can provide tools for self-adjusted risk assessment and obtain novel insights on the set of domains for the associated tasks.
Contributions (1) We indicate the utility of min-max optimization beyond AT by proposing a general and theoretically grounded framework on adversarial attack and defense. (2) We demonstrate the effectiveness of our min-max framework by evaluating the proposed APGD attack on MNIST and CIFAR-10. In theory, we prove that APGD has O(1/T ) converges rate, where T is number of iterations. In practice, we show that APGD obtains 40.79%, 35.21% and 9.39% improvement on average compared with PGD attack. (3) We propose a generalized AT scheme under mixed types of adversarial attacks. Compared with vanilla AT, our new training scheme leads to better worst-case robustness even if the defender lacks prior knowledge of the strengths of attacks. (4) We show how the weighting factors of the probability simplex help to obtain novel insights for associated tasks and interpreting the importance of candidates in domains.
Related Work Recent studies have identified that DNNs are highly vulnerable to adversarial manipulations in various applications [1, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , thus leading to an arms race between adversarial attacks [3, 5, [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] and defenses [4, [28] [29] [30] [31] . One intriguing property of adversarial examples is the transferability across multiple domains [32] [33] [34] [35] , which indicates a more challenging yet promising research direction -devising universal adversarial perturbations over model ensembles [6, 7] , input samples [8, 36] and data transformations [5, 9, 10] . However, current approaches suffer from a significant performance loss for resting on the uniform averaging strategy. We will compare these works with our min-max method in Sec. 4 . As a natural extension following min-max attack, we study the generalized AT under multiple perturbations as two independent works [11, 12] of the same time but providing a unique solution. Finally, our min-max framework is adapted and inspired by previous literature on robust learning over multiple domains [37] [38] [39] [40] .
Min-Max Power in Adversarial Attack and Defense
We begin by introducing the principle of robust learning over multiple domains and its connection to a specialized form of min-max optimization. Then we show that the resulting min-max formulation fits into various attack settings including a) ensemble adversarial attack, b) universal adversarial perturbation and c) robust perturbation over data transformations. Furthermore, we propose a generalized AT framework under mixed types of adversarial attacks.
General idea: Robust learning over multiple domains
Consider K loss functions {F i (v)} (each of which is defined on a learning domain), the problem of robust learning over K domains can be formulated as [37] [38] [39] 
where v and w are optimization variables, V is a constraint set, and P denotes the probability simplex P = {w | 1 T w = 1, w i ∈ [0, 1], ∀i}. Since the inner maximization problem in (1) is a linear function of w over the probabilistic simplex, problem (1) is thus equivalent to
where [K] denotes the integer set {1, 2, . . . , K}.
Benefit and computation challenge of (1) Compared to multi-task learning in a finite-sum formulation which minimizes K losses on average, problem (1) provides consistently robust worst-case performance across all domains. This can be explained from the epigraph form of (2),
where t is an epigraph variable [41] that provides the t-level robustness at each domain.
Although the min-max problem (1) offers a great robustness interpretation as in (3), solving it becomes more challenging than solving the finite-sum problem. It is clear from (2) that the inner maximization problem of (1) always returns the one-hot value of w, namely, w = e i , where e i is the ith standard basis vector, and i = arg max i {F i (v)}. The one-hot coding reduces the generalizability to other domains and induces instability of the learning procedure in practice. Such an issue is often mitigated by introducing a strongly concave regularizer in the inner maximization step [39, 37] .
Regularized problem formulation Spurred by [37], we penalize the distance between the worstcase loss and the average loss over K domains. This yields
where γ > 0 is a regularization parameter. As γ → 0, problem (4) is equivalent to (1) . By contrast, it becomes the finite-sum problem when γ → ∞ since w → 1/K. In this sense, the trainable w provides an essential indicator on the importance level of each domain. The larger the weight is, the more important the domain is. We call w domain weights in this paper. We next show how the principle of robust learning over multiple domains can fit into various settings of adversarial attack and defense problems.
Robust adversarial attacks
The general goal of adversarial attack is to craft an adversarial example x = x 0 + δ ∈ R d to mislead the prediction of machine learning (ML) or deep learning (DL) systems, where x 0 denotes the natural example with the true label t 0 , and δ is known as adversarial perturbation, commonly subject to
given small number . Here the p norm enforces the similarity between x and x 0 , and the input space of ML/DL systems is normalized to
Ensemble attack over multiple models Consider K ML/DL models
, the goal is to find robust adversarial examples that can fool all K models simultaneously. In this case, the notion of 'domain' in (4) is specified as 'model', and the objective function F i in (4) signifies the attack loss f (δ; x 0 , y 0 , M i ) given the natural input (x 0 , y 0 ) and the model M i . Thus, problem (4) becomes
where w encodes the difficulty level of attacking each model.
Universal perturbation over multiple examples
and a single model M, our goal is to find the universal perturbation δ so that all the corrupted K examples can fool M. In this case, the notion of 'domain' in (4) is specified as 'example', and problem (4) becomes
where different from (5), w encodes the difficulty level of attacking each example.
Adversarial attack over data transformations Consider K categories of data transformation {p i }, e.g., rotation, lightening, and translation [42] , our goal is to find the adversarial attack that is robust to data transformations. In this case, the notion of 'domain' in (4) is specified as 'data transformer', and problem (4) becomes
where E t∼pi [f (t(x 0 +δ); y 0 , M)] denotes the attack loss under the distribution of data transformation p i , and w encodes the difficulty level of attacking each type of transformed example x 0 .
Adversarial training (AT) under mixed types of adversarial attacks
Conventional AT is restricted to a single type of norm-ball constrained adversarial attack [4] . For example, AT under ∞ attack yields
where θ ∈ R n denotes model parameters, δ denotes -tolerant ∞ attack, and f tr (θ, δ; x, y) is the training loss under perturbed examples {(x + δ, y)}. However, there possibly exist blind attacking spots across multiple types of adversarial attacks so that AT under one attack would not be strong enough against another attack [11, 12] . Thus, an interesting question is how to generalize AT under multiple types of adversarial attacks. One possible way is to use the finite-sum formulation
where δ i ∈ X i is the ith type of adversarial perturbation defined on X i , e.g., different p attacks.
Moreover, one can map 'attack type' to 'domain' considered in (1). We then perform AT against the strongest adversarial attack across K attack types in order to avoid blind attacking spots [12] . That is, upon defining F i (θ) := maximize δi∈Xi f tr (θ, δ i ; x, y), we solve the problem of the form (2),
In fact, problem (10) is in the min-max-max form, however, Lemma 1 shows that problem (10) can be further simplified to the min-max form. Lemma 1. Problem (10) is equivalent to
where w ∈ R K represent domain weights, and P has been defined in (1). Proof: see Appendix A.
Similar to (4), a strongly concave regularizer −γ/2 w − 1/K 2 2 can be added into the inner maximization problem of (11) , which can boost the stability of the learning procedure and strike a balance between the max and the average attack performance. However, solving problem (11) and its regularized version is more complicated than (4) since the inner maximization involves both domain weights w and adversarial perturbations {δ i }, and the outer minimization is used to train possibly high-dimensional model parameters θ.
We finally remark that there was an independent work [11] which also proposed the formulation (10) for AT under multiple perturbations. However, what we propose here is the regularized formulation of (11) . As will be evident later, the domain weights w in our formulation have strong interpretability, which learns the importance level of different attacks. Most significantly, our work has different motivation from [11] , and our idea applies to not only AT but also attack generation in Sec. 2.2.
Proposed Algorithm and Theory
In this section, we delve into technical details on how to efficiently solve problems of robust adversarial attacks given by the generic form (4) and problem (11) for generalized AT under mixed types of adversarial attacks. We propose the alternating one-step projected gradient descent (APGD) method (Algorithm 1) to solve problem (4). For clarity, we repeat problem (4) under the adversarial perturbation δ and its constraint set X defined in Sec. 2.2,
We show that at each iteration, APGD takes only one-step PGD for outer minimization and one-step projected gradient ascent for inner maximization (namely, PGD for its negative objective function). We also show that each alternating step has a closed-form expression, and the main computational complexity stems from computing the gradient of the attack loss w.r.t. the input. Therefore, APGD is computationally efficient like PGD, which is commonly used for design of conventional single p -norm based adversarial attacks [4] .
Outer minimization Considering w = w (t−1) and (4), we perform one-step PGD to update δ at iteration t,
where proj(·) denotes the Euclidean projection operator, i.e., proj X (a) = arg min x∈X x − a 2 2 at the point a, α > 0 is a given learning rate, and ∇ δ denotes the first order gradient w.r.t. δ.
In (13) , the projection operation becomes the key to obtain the closed-form of the updating rule (13) . Recall from Sec. 2.2 that X = {δ| δ p ≤ ,č ≤ δ ≤ĉ}, where p ∈ {0, 1, 2, ∞}, andč = −x 0 andĉ = 1 − x 0 (implyingč ≤ 0 ≤ĉ). If p = ∞, then the projection function becomes the clip function. However, when p ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the closed-form of projection operation becomes non-trivial. In Proposition 1, we derive the solution of proj X (a) under different p norms. Proposition 1. Given a point a ∈ R d and a constraint set X = {δ| δ p ≤ ,č ≤ δ ≤ĉ}, the Euclidean projection δ * = proj X (a) has a closed-form solution when p ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Inner maximization By fixing δ = δ (t) and letting ψ(w) :
in problem (4), we then perform one-step PGD (w.r.t. −ψ) to update w,
where β > 0 is a given learning rate,
In (14), the second equality holds due to the closed-form of projection operation onto the probabilistic simplex P [43] , where (·) + denotes the elementwise non-negative operator, i.e., (x) + = max{0, x}, and µ is the root of the equation 1
and can be found via the bisection method [41] .
Convergence analysis We remark that APGD follows the gradient primal-dual optimization framework [40] , and thus enjoys the same optimization guarantees. In Theorem 1, we demonstrate the convergence rate of Algorithm 1 for solving problem (4). Theorem 1. (inherited from primal-dual min-max optimization) Suppose that in problem (4) F i (δ) has L-Lipschitz continuous gradients, and X is a convex compact set. Given learning rates α ≤ 
Alternating multi-step PGD for generalized AT
We next propose the alternating multi-step projected gradient descent (AMPGD) method to solve the regularized version of problem (11), which is repeated as follows
Algorithm 2 AMPGD to solve problem (15) 1: Input: given θ (0) , w (0) , δ (0) and K > 0. 2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do given w (t−1) and δ (t−1) , perform SGD to update θ (t) [4] 4:
given θ (t) , perform R-step PGD to update w (t) and δ (t)
5: end for
Problem (15) is in a more general non-convex non-concave min-max setting, where the inner maximization involves both domain weights w and adversarial perturbations {δ i }. It was shown in [45] that the multi-step PGD is required for inner maximization in order to approximate the near-optimal solution. This is also in the similar spirit of AT [4] , which executed multi-step PGD attack during inner maximization. We summarize AMPGD in Algorithm 2. At step 4 of Algorithm 2, each PGD step to up-date w and δ can be decomposed as
where let w
. Here the subscript t represents the iteration index of AMPGD, and the subscript r denotes the iteration index of R-step PGD. Clearly, the above projection operations can be derived for closed-form expressions through (14) and Lemma 1. To the best of our knowledge, it is still an open question to build theoretical convergence guarantees for solving the general non-convex non-concave min-max problem like (15) , except the work [45] which proposed O(1/T ) convergence rate if the objective function satisfies Polyak-Łojasiewicz conditions [46] .
Experiments
In this section, we begin by evaluating the proposed min-max optimization strategy on three attack tasks. We show that our approach leads to substantial improvement compared with state-of-the-art attack methods such as ensemble PGD [7] and expectation over transformation (EOT) [5, 10, 42] . Moreover, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the generalized AT for multiple types of adversarial perturbations. We show that the use of trainable domain weights in problem (15) can automatically adjust the risk level of different attacks during the training process even if the defender lacks prior knowledge on the strength of these attacks.
Experimental setup
We thoroughly evaluate our APGD/AMPGD algorithm on MNIST and CIFAR-10. A set of diverse image classifiers (Model A to H) are trained, including multi-layer perceptrons (MLP), All-CNNs [47] , LeNet [48] , LeNetV2, VGG16 [49] , ResNet50 [50] , Wide-ResNet [4, 51] and GoogLeNet [52] . More details about model architectures and training process are provided in Appendix C.
Robust adversarial attacks
Most current works play a min-max game from a defender's perspective, i.e., adversarial training. However, we show the great strength of min-max optimization also lies at the side of attack generation. Note that problem formulations (5)-(7) are applicable to both untargeted and targeted attack. Here we focus on the former setting and use C&W loss function [3, 4] with a confidence parameter κ = 50.
Ensemble attack over multiple models We craft adversarial examples against an ensemble of known classifiers. The work [7, 5th place at CAAD-18] proposed an ensemble PGD attack, which assumed equal importance among different models, namely, w i = 1/K in problem (1) . Throughout this task, we measure the attack performance via ASR all -the attack success rate (ASR) of fooling model ensembles simultaneously. Compared to the ensemble PGD attack [7] , our approach results in 40.79% and 17.48% ASR all improvement averaged over different p -norm constraints on MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. In what follows, we provide more detailed experiment results and analysis. Comparison of average and min-max (APGD) ensemble attack over four models on MNIST. Acc (%) represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples. Here we set the iterations of APGD as 50 for attack generation. The learning rates α, β and regularization factor γ are set as -0 : α = 2, β = 40, γ = 3, In Table 1 , we show that our min-max APGD significantly outperforms ensemble PGD in ASR all . Taking ∞ -attack as an example, our min-max attack leads to a 90.16% ASR all , which largely Table 1. outperforms 48.17% (ensemble PGD). The reason is that Model C, D are more difficult to attack, which can be observed from their higher test accuracy on adversarial examples. As a result, although the adversarial examples crafted by assigning equal weights over multiple models are able to attack {A, B} well, they achieve a much lower ASR (i.e., 1 -Acc) in {C, D}. By contrast, APGD automatically handles the worst case {C, D} by slightly sacrificing the performance on {A, B}: 31.47% averaged ASR improvement on {C, D} versus 0.86% degradation on {A, B}. More results on CIFAR-10 and advanced DNNs (e.g., GoogLeNet) are provided in Appendix D.1. Also, tracking domain weights w provides us novel insights for model robustness and understanding attack procedure. From our theory, a model with higher robustness always corresponds to a larger w because its loss is hard to attack and becomes the "worst" term. This hypothesis can be verified empirically. According to Figure 1c , we have w c > w d > w a > w b -indicating a decrease in model robustness for C, D, A and B, which is exactly verified by Acc C > Acc D > Acc A > Acc B in Table 1 .
Universal perturbation over multiple examples Similarly, we evaluate APGD in universal perturbation on MNIST and CIFAR-10, where 10,000 test images are randomly divided into equal-size groups (containing K images per group) for universal perturbation. We measure two types of ASR (%), ASR avg and ASR gp . Here the former represents the ASR over all images in all groups, and the latter signifies the ASR over all groups but images within each group must be successfully attacked simultaneously by universal perturbation. When K = 5, our approach achieves 42.63% and 35.21% averaged ASR all improvement over given models on MNIST and CIFAR-10 compared to the averaging strategy. Table 2 compares the average with the min-max strategy on universal perturbation. As we can see, our method (APGD) always achieves higher ASR gp for different values of K. Similar to min-max ensemble attack, APGD can successfully attack images that the average-based PGD method fails to attack by adjusting domain weights, and thus leading to a higher ASR gp . Besides, the minmax universal perturbation also offers interpretability of "image robustness" by associating domain Table 2 : Comparison of average and minmax optimization on universal perturbation over multiple input examples. The adversarial examples are generated by ∞-APGD with α = 6, β = 50 and γ = 4. Table 3 : Comparison of average and min-max optimization on robust attack over multiple data transformations on CIFAR-10. Acc (%) represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples ( ∞-APGD ( = 0.03) with α = 2, β = 100 and γ = 10) under different transformations.
Model
Opt. weights with image visualization; see Appendix D.3 for an example in which the large domain weight corresponds to the MNIST letter with clear appearance (e.g., bold letter).
Robust adversarial attack over data transformations EOT [42] achieves state-of-the-art performance in producing adversarial examples robust to data transformations. From (7), we could derive EOT as a special case when the weights satisfy w i = 1/K (average case). For each input sample (ori), we transform the image under a series of functions, e.g., flipping horizontally (flh) or vertically (flv), adjusting brightness (bri), performing gamma correction (gam) and cropping (crop), and group each image with its transformed variants. Similar to universal perturbation, ASR avg and ASR gp are reported to measure the ASR over all transformed images and groups of transformed images (each group is successfully attacked signifies successfully attacking an example under all transformers). As shown in Table 3 , compared to EOT, our approach leads to 9.39% averaged lift in ASR gp over given models on CIFAR-10 by optimizing the weights for various transformations. Due to limited space, we leave the details of transformers in Append C.3 and the results under randomness (e.g., flipping images randomly w.p. 0.8; randomly clipping the images at specific range) in Appendix D.1.
Adversarial training for multiple adversarial perturbations
Compared to vanilla AT, we show the generalized AT scheme produces models robust to multiple types of perturbation, thus leads to stronger "overall robustness". We measure the training performance using two types of Acc (%): Acc Figure 3b) as a measure of the overall worst-case robustness (denoting as S ). Table 4 shows the test accuracy of MLP in different training schemes: a) natural training; b) singlenorm: vanilla AT ( ∞ or 2 ); c) multi-norm: generalized AT (avg and min max). If the adversary only performs single-type attack, training and testing on the same attack type leads to the best performance (diagonal of ∞ -2 block). However, for the union of ∞ and 2 attacks, our AMPGD [12] ), where the ∞ and 2 balls are not completely overlapped. In Figure 3a , as 2 increases, 2 -attack becomes stronger so the corresponding w also increases, which is consistent with min-max spiritdefending the strongest attack. Note that min max or avg training does not always lead to the best performance on Acc max adv and Acc avg adv , especially when the strengths of two attacks diverge greatly (see Table A7 ). This can be explained by the large overlapping between ∞ and 2 balls (see Figure A2 ). However, Figure 3b and 3c show that AMPGD is able to achieve a rather robust model no matter how changes (red lines), which empirically verifies the effectiveness of our proposed training scheme. In terms of the area-under-the-curve measure S , AMPGD achieves the highest worst-case robustness: 6.27% and 17.64% accuracy improvement compared to the vanilla AT with ∞ and 2 attacks, respectively.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general min-max framework applicable to both adversarial attack and defense settings. We show that many problem setups can be re-formulated under this general framework. Extensive experiments show that proposed algorithms lead to significant improvement on multiple attack and defense tasks compared with previous state-of-the-art approaches. In particular, we obtain 40.79%, 35.21% and 9.39% improvement on attacking model ensembles, devising universal perturbation to input samples, and data transformations under CIFAR-10, respectively. Our minmax scheme also generalizes adversarial training (AT) for multiple types of adversarial attacks, attaining faster convergence and better robustness compared to the vanilla AT and the average strategy. Moreover, our approach provides a holistic tool for self-risk assessment by learning domain weights.
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where w ∈ R K represent domain weights, and P has been defined in (1).
Proof of Lemma 1:
Similar to (1), problem (10) is equivalent to
Recall that F i (θ) := maximize δi∈Xi f tr (θ, δ i ; x, y), problem can then be written as
According to proof by contradiction, it is clear that problem (17) is equivalent to
B Proof of Proposition 1 Proposition 1. Given a point a ∈ R d and a constraint set X = {δ| δ p ≤ ,č ≤ δ ≤ĉ}, the Euclidean projection δ * = proj X (a) has the closed-form solution when p ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
1) If p = 1, then δ * is given by
where x i denotes the ith element of a vector x; P [či,ĉi] (·) denotes the clip function over the in-
where λ 2 ∈ (0, a 2 / − 1] is the root of
3) If p = 0 and ∈ N + , then δ * is given by
where [η] denotes the -th largest element of η, and δ i = P [či,ĉi] (a i ).
Proof of Proposition 1:
1 norm When we find the Euclidean projection of a onto the set X , we solve minimize
where
is the indicator function of the set [č,ĉ]. The Langragian of this problem is
The minimizer δ * minimizes the Lagrangian, it is obtained by elementwise soft-thresholding
. where x i is the ith element of a vector x, P [či,ĉi] (·) is the clip function over the interval [č i ,ĉ i ].
The primal, dual feasibility and complementary slackness are
, where λ 1 is given by the root of the equation
Bisection method can be used to solve the above equation for λ 1 , starting with the initial interval (0, max
2 norm When we find the Euclidean projection of a onto the set X , we solve minimize
The minimizer δ * minimizes the Lagrangian, it is
λ2+1 a i , where λ 2 is given by the root of the equation
Bisection method can be used to solve the above equation for λ 2 , starting with the initial interval (0,
0 norm For 0 norm in X , it is independent to the box constraint. So we can clip a to the box constraint first, which is δ i = P [či,ĉi] (a i ), and then project it onto 0 norm.
We find the additional Euclidean distance of every element in a and zero after they are clipped to the box constraint, which is
It can be equivalently written as
To derive the Euclidean projection onto 0 norm, we find the -th largest element in η and call it [η] . We keep the elements whose corresponding η i is above or equals to -th, and set rest to zeros. The closed-form solution is given by
C Experiment Setup
For reproducibility, the anonymous code repository is publicly accessible 3 with detailed instructions and scripts about how to exactly reproduce the results reported in the paper.
C.1 Model Architectures and Training Details
For a comprehensive evaluation of proposed algorithms, we adopt a set of diverse DNN models (Model A to H), including multi-layer perceptrons (MLP), All-CNNs [47] , LeNet [48] , LeNetV2 4 , VGG16 [49] , ResNet50 [50] , Wide-ResNet [4] and GoogLeNet [52] . For the last four models, we use the exact same architecture as original papers and evaluate them only on CIFAR-10 dataset. The details for model architectures are provided in Table A2 . For compatibility with our framework, we implement and train these models based on the strategies adopted in pytorch-cifar 5 and achieve comparable performance on clean images (see Table A1 ). To foster reproducibility, all the trained models are publicly accessible in the anonymous link 6 . Specifically, we trained MNIST classifiers for 50 epochs with Adam and a constant learning rate of 0.001. For CIFAR-10 classifers, the models are trained for 250 epochs with SGD (using 0.8 nesterov momentum, weight decay 5e −4 ). The learning rate is reduced at epoch 100 and 175 with a decay rate of 0.1. The initial learning rate is set as 0.01 for models {A, B, C, D, H} and 0.1 for {E, F, G}. Note that no data augmentation is employed in the training.
C.2 Crafting adversarial examples
We adopt variant C&W loss in APGD/PGD as suggested in [4, 3] . Cross-entropy loss is also supported in our implementation. The adversarial examples are generated by 20-step PGD/APGD unless otherwise stated (e.g., 50 steps for ensemble attacks). Due to varying model robustness Softmax Softmax
on different datasets, the perturbation magnitudes are set separately. 
C.3 Details of conducted data transformations
To demonstrate the effectiveness of APGD in generating robust adversarial examples against multiple transformations, we adopt a series of common transformations, including a&b) flipping images horizontally (flh) and vertically (flv); c) adjusting image brightness (bri); d) performing gamma correction (gam), e) cropping and re-sizing images (crop); f) rotating images (rot).
Moreover, both deterministic and stochastic transformations are considered in our experiments. In particular, Table 3 and Table A6 are deterministic settings -rot: rotating images 30 degree clockwise; crop: cropping images in the center (0.8 × 0.8) and resizing them to 32 × 32; bri: adjusting the brightness of images with a scale of 0.1; gam: performing gamma correction with a value of 1.3. Differently, in Table A5 , we introduce randomness for drawing samples from the distribution -rot: rotating images randomly from -10 to 10 degree; crop: cropping images in the center randomly (from 0.6 to 1.0); other transformations are done with a probability of 0.8. In experiments, we adopt tf.image API 9 for processing the images.
D Supplementary Results

D.1 Robust adversarial attacks
Ensemble attack over multiple models Table A3 and A4 show the performance of average (ensemble PGD [7] ) and min-max (APGD) strategies for attacking model ensembles. Our min-max approach results in 19.27% and 15.69% averaged improvement on ASR all over model sets {A, B, C, D} and {A, E, F, H} on CIFAR-10. Table A3 : Comparison of average and min-max (APGD) ensemble attack over four models on CIFAR-10. Acc (%) represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples. The learning rates α, β and regularization factor γ are set as -0 : α = 1, β = 150, γ = 1, 1 : α = 4, β = 100, γ = 5, 2 : α = 8, β = 100, γ = 3; ∞ : α = 5, β = 50, γ = 6. The attack iteration for APGD is set as 50. Table A4 : Comparison of average and min-max (APGD) ensemble attack over four models on CIFAR-10. Acc (%) represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples. The learning rates α, β and regularization factor γ are set as -0 : α = 1, β = 150, γ = 1, 1 : α = 4, β = 100, γ = 5, 2 : α = 8, β = 100, γ = 3; ∞ : α = 5, β = 50, γ = 6. The attack iteration for APGD is set as 50. Robust adversarial attack over data transformations Table A5 and A6 compare the performance of average (EOT [42] ) and min-max (APGD) strategies. Our approach results in 4.31% and 8.22% averaged lift over four models {A, B, C, D} on CIFAR-10 under given stochastic and deterministic transformation sets. Table A5 : Comparison of average and min-max optimization on robust attack over multiple data transformations on CIFAR-10. Note that all data transformations are conducted stochastically with a probability of 0.8, except for crop which randomly crops a central area from original image and re-size it into 32 × 32. The adversarial examples are generated by 20-step ∞-APGD ( = 0.03) with α = 2, β = 100 and γ = 10. Figure A1 presents "overall robustness" comparison of our min-max generalized AT scheme and vanilla AT with single type of attacks ( ∞ and 2 ) on MNIST (LeNet). Similarly, our min-max training scheme leads to a higher "overall robustness" measured by S . In practice, due to the lacking knowledge of the strengths/types of the attacks used by adversaries, it is meaningful to enhance "overall robustness" of models under the worst perturbation (Acc max adv ). Specifically, our min-max generalized AT leads to 6.27% and 17.63% improvement on S compared to single-type AT with ∞ and 2 attacks. Furthermore, weighting factor w of the probability simplex helps understand the behavior of AT under mixed types of attacks. Our AMPGD algorithm will adjust w automatically according to the min-max principle -defending the strongest attack. In Table A6 : Comparison of average and min-max optimization on robust attack over multiple data transformations on CIFAR-10. Here a new rotation (rot) transformation is introduced, where images are rotated 30 degrees clockwise. Note that all data transformations are conducted with a probability of 1.0. The adversarial examples are generated by 20-step ∞-APGD ( = 0.03) with α = 2, β = 100 and γ = 10. Figure A1a , as 2 increases, 2 -attack becomes stronger so its corresponding w increases as well. When 2 ≥ 2.5, 2 -attack dominates the adversarial training process. That is to say, our AMPGD algorithm will put more weights on stronger attacks even if the strengths of attacks are unknown, which is a meritorious feature in practice. Overlap of p -norm balls As reported in Sec. 4.3, our min-max generalized AT does not always result in the best performance on the success rate of defending the worst/strongest perturbation (Acc max adv ) for given ( ∞ , 2 ) pair, especially when the strengths of two attacks diverge greatly (e.g., for ∞ and 2 attacks are 0.2 and 0.5). In what follows, we provide explanation and analysis about this finding inspired by recent work [12] . Figure A2 shows the real overlap of ∞ and 2 norm balls in adversarial attacks for MLP model on MNIST. Ideally, if 2 satisfies ∞ < 2 < ∞ × √ d, ∞ and 2 balls will not cover each other completely [12] . In other words, AT with ∞ and 2 attacks cannot interchange with each other. However, the real range of 2 for keeping 2 and ∞ balls intersected is not ( ∞ , ∞ × √ d), because crafted adversarial examples are not uniformly distributed in p -norm balls. In Figure A2b , 99.98% adversarial examples devising using 2 attack are also inside ∞ ball, even if 0.2 < 2 = 0.5 < 5.6. In consequence, AT with ∞ attack is enough to handle 2 -attack in overwhelming majority cases, which results in better performance than min-max optimization (Table A7a ). Figure A2c presents the average p distance of adversarial examples with 2 increasing. The average 2 -norm (green line) of adversarial examples generated by ∞ attack remains around 2.0 with a slight rising trend. This is consistent to our setting -fixing 2 as 0.2. It also indicates model robustness may effect the behavior of attacks -as 2 increases, robustly trained MLP model becomes more robust against 2 examples, so the ∞ attacker implicitly increases 2 norm to attack the model more effectively. On the other hand, the average ∞ -norm increases substantially as 2 increases from 0.5 to 2.5. When 2 arriving at 0.85, the average ∞ norm gets close to 0.2, so around half adversarial examples generated by 2 -attack are also inside ∞ balls, which is consistent with Table A2b .
Learning curve under different training schemes Figure A3 shows the learning curves of model A under different AT schemes, where two setting are plotted: (a) ( ∞ , 2 ) = (0.2, 0.5); (b) ( ∞ , 2 ) = (0.2, 2.0). Apart from better worst-case robustness shown in Table A7 , our min-max generalized AT leads to a faster convergence compared to average-based AT, especially when the strengths of two attacks diverge greatly. For instance, when 2 = 0.5 ( Figure A3a 
D.3 Interpretability of domain weight w on universal perturbation to multiple images
Tracking domain weight w of the probability simplex from our algorithms is an exclusive feature of solving problem 1. In Sec 4, we show the strength of w in understanding the procedure of optimization and interpreting the adversarial robustness. Here we would like to show the usage of w in measuring "image robustness" on devising universal perturbation to multiple input samples. Table A8 and A9 show the image groups on MNIST with weight w in APGD and two metrics (distortion of 2-C&W, minimum for ∞ -PGD) of measuring the difficulty of attacking single images. The binary search is utilized to searching for the minimum perturbation.
Although adversaries need to consider a trade-off between multiple images while devising universal perturbation, we find that weighting factor w in APGD is highly correlated under different p norms. Furthermore, w is also highly related to minimum distortion required for attacking a single image successfully. It means the inherent "image robustness" exists and effects the behavior of generating universal perturbation. Larger weight w usually indicates an image with higher robustness (e.g., fifth 'zero' in the first row of Table A8 ), which usually corresponds to the MNIST letter with clear appearance (e.g., bold letter). Table A7 : Adversarial training of MNIST models with single attacks ( ∞ and 2) and multiple attacks (avg. and min max). During the training process, the perturbation magnitude ∞ is fixed as 0.2, and 2 are changed from 0.5 to 3.0 with a step size of 0.5. For min-max scheme, the adversarial examples are crafted using 20-step ∞-APGD with α = 6, β = 50 and γ = 4. The ratio of adversarial and benign examples in adversarial training is set as 1.0. 
